A SOCIALIST SOCIETY CANNOT BE DEMOCRATIC

T. MATHEW



FORUM OF FREE ENTERPRISE SOHRAB HOUSE, 235, Dr. D. N. ROAD, BOMBAY-1

"People must come to accept private enterprise not as a necessary evil, but as an affirmative good."

—Eugene Black President, World Bank

A SOCIALIST SOCIETY CANNOT BE DEMOCRATIC*

by

T. MATHEW

The Preamble to our Constitution epitomises the ideals and aspirations of a democratic society. But democracy is a word which means different things to different people. It has been made to accommodate almost all forms of government enjoying the support of the majority of the people, no matter how that support has been obtained or what the methods adopted to ensure that support. An intelligent discussion of democracy, therefore, requires that the word be defined in precise and clear terms so as to avoid ambiguity and confusion in the course of explanation. In defining the term we have to take note of the meaning, which, in the history of political institutions, men have commonly attributed to it - a meaning which derives partly from the experience and partly from the aspirations of mankind. The essential test of a democracy has been the belief that the source of political authority must be and remain in the people and not in the rulers. people have the freedom to determine the nature and content of political power, to place and replace magistrates in positions of political trust, to enact and revoke the laws by which they are governed. In short, it will be self-government; a government in consonance with and based upon the development of personality and individuality in every self. It will be a government by the people, not as an unorganized mass, not even as an organized majority, but as a society of living selves. It will not rest on mere numbers or quantity, but on the ethical quality and value of social life which is at once its foundation and its product. This

^{*} This essay was awarded the second prize in our essay competition for the public on "Democracy in India". The author is a lecturer in economics.

has been the meaning that history has impressed upon the word 'democracy'.

Man was well advanced in the highway of civilization when democracy made its first notable appearance in the small citystates of Greece, where it flourished for the short period of a century or two and then disappeared. In Rome and other Italian cities it did not survive the conquest of the world by the Roman Republic. Some medieval cities of Europe had a fair measure of self-government in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries when it was replaced by the military penetration of oligarchies or the encroachment of despotic monarchies. England democracy is not older than the seventeenth century; in America it is younger still. Only in the nineteenth century, with the development of industry and the emancipation of the economy from the stranglehold of the mercantilist state, did it make any appreciable headway in many of the countries of Europe and elsewhere. Democracy, thus, though of ancient lineage, has had only a temporary welcome from and precarious hold on, the people. This may, perhaps, be explained by the fact, that it is not an easy, or a convenient form of government, it is a delicate and expensive kind of "social mechanism" which depends for its success upon the presence of certain moral and material conditions which will generate the necessary virtues for its operation.

Among the moral conditions necessary for the maintenance of democracy primacy has to be ascribed to liberty. Liberty is that essential condition or quality "which individual personality must possess in order that it may translate itself from being what it is to what it has the capacity of becoming". It is the moral ability of determining one's own actions in the light of one's perception of the good life; i.e., it is a claim made by the individual for self-determination of the methods of achieving his moral perfection.

But a moral personality does not exist in a vacuum and, therefore, moral perfection cannot be achieved except in and through a society of personalities, in which the individual members, acting in collaboration, try to transform their idea of good life into an idea of social thought worthy of attainment by common efforts. This society does not stand above its members or separate from

^{1.} E. Barker: Réflections on Government, p. 16.

them, but it exists in them. It has a double purpose; to act as an agent (i) for the adjustment of relations, and (ii) for the interchange of the idea of good life and the ways of achieving it. The first issues forth in a system of laws through which adjustments called constitutional, civil and political liberties are maintained. The second manifests itself in the organization of voluntary associations in every significant sphere of social life, which facilitate an interchange of ideas through a system of social discussion which is an essential aspect of democratic society.

Historical experience has revealed that man has more scope of developing his individuality within the co-operative life of associations than in the compulsory life of the state. These associations are the nurseries of the individual's inherent qualities of initiative, enterprise, experiment, and of 'creativeness'; and they are productive of greater freedom because in their aggregate they constitute the entire substance of social life. The chief aim of these associations is to help the individual in the maximization of his capacity of self-direction; and the chief means adopted to that end is the minimum of compulsion. Both the end and the means are conjoined in the concept of liberty - liberty of thought so that truth may prevail; liberty of action so that careers may be opened to talent; liberty of self-government so that none will be compelled against his will. Liberty is thus a 'natural mechanism' for bringing about the moral and material progress of mankind. It is the first principle of a democratic society.

But liberty is the product of rights. "It is the atmosphere created by rights." And rights are 'those conditions of social life without which no man can seek in general, to be himself at his best". This would imply that rights are to be of necessity only those conditions, conforming to man's nature, as will enable him to develop his moral personality. In this sense rights are natural in that they emanate from his nature and are meant as aids to work out its perfection. Therefore, the state does not create rights, but only recognizes or ought to recognize them. And this recognition of rights is now found in almost all the modern democratic constitutions in the world. Our constitution contains a section on Fundamental Rights pertaining to Equality, Freedom, Property, Religion, Culture and Education and Constitutional Remedies.

^{2.} Laski: Grammar of Politics, p. 91.

^{3.} Ibid.

These are very necessary and important rights, but the most important among them all, being the foundation as it were of others, is the right to property. I am aware that in saying this I am not in line with the fashion of the times. But the fact cannot be denied that in order to eniov the primary right to life, man has the right to goods required for actual consumption to preserve life. Further, he has the right to the instruments whereby more of these goods can be produced, for man being reasonable, cannot, like animals, live on mere chance: he has, in various degrees, what is called the prospectiveness of the future; also for this reason, some resources must be preserved against future contingencies, like accidents, sickness and old age. Finally, man must be able to satisfy his economic needs, that he may live his life in the full implications of its social, intellectual and moral aspects. Besides, the duty to bring up, maintain and develop a family is a permanent responsibility which cannot be fulfilled without that permanence to means which private property on consumable and productive goods can alone secure. The right to own property, therefore, is necessarily postulated by the nature of man.

Moreover, history is a witness to the fact that only those peoples and societies which had the right to property secured to them had really been able to enjoy liberty. The nature and extent of liberty was conditioned by the nature and degree of the right to property. Denial of liberty and the imposition of despotic rule of whatever description or colour have gone hand in hand with the deprivation of property rights or the comprehensive control and regulation of the exercise of this right. Hilaire Belloc expressed it very forcibly when he said that if we did not restore the institution of property we could not help restoring the institution of slavery.

It is as contemporary a fact as it is historical that the institution of private property is the most secure guarantee of freedom alike for those who own property and those who do not. It is only because the control of the means of production is diffused among many people acting independently that no one has complete power over us, that we as individuals can decide what to do with ourselves. But if the control over the means of production were concentrated either nominally infisociety or in a dictator, whoever exercises this control has absolute power over the individuals. "It seems

obvious to me," says Max Eastman4, "that the institution of private property is one of the main things that have given man that limited amount of free and equalness which Marx hoped to render infinite by abolishing this institution. He is the one who informed us, looking backwards, that the evolution of private capitalism with its free market had been a precondition for the evolution of all our democratic freedoms." Thus private property even according to the most redoubtable of its critics is the basis of democratic virtues and institutions. In India this right has been made illusory by the Fourth Amendment to the constitution in April 1955, which laid down that the courts would have no jurisdiction in regard to the amount of compensation fixed by the Parliament or a state legislature in the event of acquisition of private property. It cuts the ground from under the very basis of democratic institutions, for, it is the knowledge and assurance of the security of property rights and of a fair and adequate compensation in case the state exercises its right of 'eminent domain' to acquire porperty, that is the very foundation of a free, equal and just society. This foundation has been made shaky and until its strength and stability are restored, the mansion of democracy is in a very precarious condition. The other rights guaranteed under the constitution, and the resultant liberty of the individual seem to lose their meaning and value in the face of this great limitation placed on the right to property.

The second principle of democracy — but equally important as the first — is equality. It is essentially a spiritual concept which in the ultimate analysis cannot be tested in human experience. The facts of man's material and social life strongly indicate that men are not equal. By every test of worldly standards, of birth or wealth, strength or beauty, intellect or virtue, of usefulness, it is the gross inequality of man that stands out as the inescapable reality of human life. But the doctrine of equality asserts that these differences do not matter; indeed, they are of no value, for there is in man a quality, his personality, that is unique, and universally alike in prince and pauper, sage and sinner, which is of infinite worth and importance. When this unique equality of the human person is recognized, the superiorities that the world acknowledge seem like slight and passing ripples upon a vast

^{4.} Quoted by F. A. Hayek: Road to Serfdom, p. 78.

ocean; when it is not they appear as mountainous waves at sea. The Indian people through their long and eventful passage along the corridors of centuries did not recognize the presence of this unique quality in man, and therefore the inconsequential human differences apparent to the eyes were magnified out of all proportion to their place in the scheme of human values. The result was the compartmentalization of society into castes and thus helping to institutionalize inequality. And for centuries, religion and culture, education and the economy and the laws and their administration were utilized to foster and to perpetuate this institutionalized inequality. These same factors, especially education, the economy and the laws would again have to be used to mitigate the evils, and to undo the harm wrought by the thwarted social existence imposed on the millions in India through the caste system, before the plant of democracy can blossom and bear fruit in the country.

A society in which liberty and equality are operative ideals is also one in which reason, justice and fraternal feelings will prevail. Democracy can flourish only in a society in which reason governs the relations between individuals, for the process of democratic life and action is essentially a process of government by discussion based on reason, which proceeds through the four stages of the party, the electorate, the parliament and the cabinet. The parties formulate the subjects for discussion and place them before the electorate for it to choose. The electorate in the grand national debate of the general election chooses one among the programmes of the parties, and hands it over to the parliament for a more refined discussion and appropriate legislative enactments. The parliament submits the results of its discussion to the cabinet for executive action.

In this process of discussion a democratic society must enlist the thought of the whole community. This involves a broadening of civic intelligence and an extension of civic knowledge. They are the result of education. People, therefore, must be educated to that level at which they acquire the capacity to be active participants in the affairs of state. They must have the knowledge to judge the actions of the government in the light of their moral requirements. Without education they remain the slaves of authority, whose form and substance they can neither grasp,

nor whose institutional framework they can change. The nature of education must be based on the principles, and suited to the temperament, of democracy. People are to be trained as citizens, made zealous of their rights and conscious of their duties, aware of their opportunities as well as of their responsibilities. Then only will they be enabled to participate intelligently in the civic life of the state, and contribute their knowledge and meaningful experience to the common fund of social thought. Few will denv that the mass of the electors in India are not able to participate intelligently in the public life of the nation because of their ignorance and illiteracy. To that extent democracy has little meaning for them. Experience has revealed that many do not even realize the value of the ballot paper or the significance of the ballot box. They have nothing to contribute to the process of discussion, and lack in judgement in making their choice from among the programmes of the parties. This indicates the urgent and imperative need for the people to be educated, not only in the rudiments of knowledge, but in the importance of democracy. Indeed education should have the first priority in the scheme of national development, for without it, the democratic system of political organization and the scheme of human values associated with it, convey no significance to the mass of the people. And in order that the spirit of man may continue to remain free and democratic institutions may be worked in the manner and spirit in which they are to be worked, education must be free. state may prescribe the standard of knowledge in the various fields of science and arts expected at certain levels of education, and leave the institutions free to plan their efforts to attain that standard. Competitive examinations to determine the ability of candidates for service under the government or for admission to institutions of higher learning may be conducted to ensure the equality of opportunity enshrined in our constitution. Regimentation of education through 'nationalized' schools or through 'nationalized' textbooks in every branch of knowledge is the true and secure foundation on which totalitarianism has flourished. In India also we find instances of the state trying to become the author of books and the teacher of knowledge. That way lies the path to the grave of democracy.

Also, education in India has become the experimental ground for every politician who happens to be the minister in charge of that portfolio for the time being. In order that democracy may survive in the country, education must be free and the institutions concerned with it autonomous.

Education must also serve as an instrument to maintain and foster national unity. It seems to me that one of the serious mistakes committed since independence was the demarcation of the boundaries of states on the basis of language. It may be difficult to rectify the mistake now, but the potentialities for greater harm for national solidarity implied in this may be checked through the system of education. To have one and the same language as the medium of instruction in all the universities in India would help to minimize the separatist tendencies evident as a result of exaggerated linguistic loyalties. Against the language barriers, the issues which affect people as citizens and which are therefore to be examined by them as citizens, tend to be viewed by them from the linguistic angle as Tamils, or Telugus, or Maharashtrians or Bengalis and the like. Sometimes they are even looked at from the still narrower angle of the caste. Rarely does an Indian seem to examine and judge an issue of national concern as an Indian. This is largely due to the lack of education which trains the intellect and makes reason predominant. It may be true that the mass of men act by elementary instincts. It cannot be helped, because man is a mixed being (rational and animal), and human nature is a mixed thing. Both reason and instinct are needed. but instinct and reflex action are to be welcomed only when they are linked to the service of reason. The danger arises when they become substitutes for reason instead of auxiliaries. It is against this danger of instincts replacing reason that we have to set the guard. To develop and train reason to do its essential tasks of regulating human relations and maintaining democratic institutions, the right type of education is essential.

Democratic government can function only through the medium of the parties. They formulate the issues which the electorate discusses and on which it can act. The organization of parties must be such as to enable the people as citizens to become their members if they so desire. This would imply that the parties are to be formed on the national plane cutting across the barriers of religion, caste and language. Some of the so-called political parties in India such as the Hindu Mahasabha,

the Jan Sangh, the Dravida Munnetra Khazhagam in Madras, and the Muslim League functioning now in Kerala, by their very constitution and character are 'communal' organizations projecting their activities into the political field, and thereby vitiating the entire system of democratic life. Their membership is confined to people of particular religious persuasion or caste affiliation, and as such people as citizens have no place in their fold.

Further, there must be agreement between the parties on the fundamental postulates of democracy. Belief in and acceptance of the basic principles of democratic society and the process of democratic government are essential if the parties are to function as the instruments of democratic life. If the beliefs and fundamentals which animate parties are mutually exclusive, they cannot form part of a system of government by discussion. That is why parties which feel that their ideologies are incompatible with the democratic way of life reject democracy itself, and the only course of action they accept and follow is force and violence. They are the grave-diggers of democracy; as such prudence and expediency would advise that the liberty of the democratic society need not necessarily be extended to them, because they profess to use the freedom of democracy to destroy democracy itself.

And the issues formulated must be such as to evoke the interests of the citizens as citizens. If the issues affect only people of a particular locality or state or only a particular linguistic or communal group, there can be no discussion of a general nature on a national scale. Vast numbers of people would be excluded from participation in the civic life of the state. Issues therefore must be general and national in character so that everyone irrespective of class or sectional interests can contribute their views in the discussion to determine policy.

And further, the persuasive appeal of the parties must be made to the people on the basis of their citizenship. The party issues must be addressed to the whole citizen body, and not to any section or group in the country. Judged on this basis, many parties in India do not qualify themselves to function in a demorcacy, because their appeal is not made to the people of India, but only to the people of this state or that, of one linguistic group or the other, of this religion or caste or the other.

In a democracy political parties must offer the possibility

of real choice to the electorate through their programmes. If the issues they place before the electorate are such that the people can find no real differences between them, except one of emphasis, their freedom of choice is limited and the scope for discussion very much restricted, if not altogether absent. The programmes of Indian political parties functioning on the national plane provide no real alternative choice in regard to policy to the citizens, since all of them profess the doctrine of socialism of one variety or another. Therefore, they can offer to the citizens only one ideological policy, whatever may be the superficial differences in approach they emphasize to realize the objective. This state of affairs has come about largely as a result of the subtle attempts of the Congress Party to annihilate any opposition to it by appropriating the tenets and policies of the opposition as its own. It began by adopting the policies and programmes of the Praja Socialist Party, thereby rendering that party feeble and ineffective in its organization and unattractive in its appeal. It was reduced to the position of playing second fiddle to the Congress. Then the Congress attempted to take the wind out of the sail of the Communist Party, and at its Nagpur session borrowed some of the moth-eaten policies from the museum of communist antiquities, with the result the communists became the most vociferous unconditional supporters and advocates of the new programmes of the Congress. Thus it has come to pass that more or less the same policies are presented to the citizens under different labels by different parties. Parley or discussion, and a government based on it and functioning through its process, becomes nothing but 'a huge joke' under such a condition.

The true and successful working of a democratic government is possible only when there is a 'real opposition' to the ruling party both inside and outside the parliament. In fact opposition to the ruling party is so essential and even integral a part of parliamentary democracy, that the leader of the opposition in England—the home of parliamentary democracy—is paid a salary by the Government to oppose it! In India such a real opposition to the ruling party is lacking, not because there are no nominal opposition parties, but because they see only a very little difference between their programmes and those of the party in power. Consequently the Congress has been able to impose on the people the

doubtful 'benefits' of a monolithic state. The formation of the new Swatantra Party is none too soon, and we may legitimately hope that the new party would serve as a real opposition whenever necessary, with the preparedness and ability to shoulder responsibility of government whenever called upon by the people to do so, and thus will establish and revive the tenets of a democratic society.

Parliament in a democracy apart from possessing 'sovereign' character should also possess a plural character, in that it should contain representatives and programmes of the majority party and of the minority. This is necessitated by the nature of the scheme of government itself, because parliament works through debates and discussions and in order to be itself and do its function properly, it has to be divided against itself. The minority is not a permanent minority but one trying to convert itself into a majority when time and circumstances favour. Even if it is to remain a minority for long, it is not destroyed; its voice is not stifled or its opinions brushed aside, but are listened to with respect and accepted and acted upon whenever possible. It has sometimes been said that 'minorities must always suffer'. It is true that they must suffer, but if they always suffered and their lot is nothing but suffering, there would be little reason for their existence and little chance of their continuance. They act as well as suffer and for both they must find a meaning and an understanding response from the majority.

Justice is an indispensable quality of a democratic society. It is the resultant feature of law and rights. When the requisite rights are secured and law is applied to protect them, justice ensues as a natural and inevitable product. The most effective guarantee for democracy and of the way of life associated with it is when government is 'a government of law and not of men'. To the extent that rule of law prevails, to that extent also liberty has the chance of being safeguarded and justice implemented. Men become free only when they act within the framework of law, both of their own nature and of those made to help them to realize their nature. Then only can they be just to themselves and to others, and can expect justice from others. But justice on the social and political spheres is essentially secured through the existence and operation of the rule of law.

In the classical exposition given by Dicey, rule of law "means,

in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of government". This means that government in all its actions is bound by rules which are fixed and made known beforehand, and which therefore enable an individual to be certain as to how the government would exercise its coercive authority in particular circumstances and to plan his affairs on the basis of this certainty. Under rule of law the government is prevented from acting as it pleases according to the changing fashion of opinions. It would be precluded from stultifying individual efforts by ad hoc action. Rule of law by confining governmental action within the boundaries of known and definite rules ensures necessary limitations on the exercise of power by political authorities, and infuses definiteness and certainty to the course of governmental action which enables the individuals to pursue their avocations in freedom. In India our constitution and our laws are designed to secure limitations on the exercise of governmental authority and to provide certainty to the course and nature of governmental action. Under the rule of law a permanent legal framework would be created within which the individual would have the freedom and choice to live his life in the full implications of his personality. He would have the liberty to engage in productive activities guided by his own decisions. The law would confine itself to fixing the rules determining the conditions under which the available resources may be used. leaving the individuals free to decide the ends for which they are to be used. This freedom under the rule of law will be negatived when the economic activities are to conform to the decisions of a centralised planning body. Such a planning authority cannot satisfy itself with merely providing general conditions and opportunities for the people to make use of them according to their judgement. It has to decide questions of priority and allocations which cannot be answered by formal principles only, and in making the decisions it necessarily has to discriminate in favour of one rather than the other. These decisions will be the reflections of the views of the planning authority, and they ultimately become part of the law of the land. Rule of law would give way to arbitrary decisions having the force of law, but not its permanence being the product of the varying circumstances of the moment.

'Discretionary authority of the government', the exercise of which is contradictory to the rule of law according to Dicey, becomes a necessity to a planned society, if planning is to succeed: to that extent it loses the essential character of a democracy. And as the tempo of planning increases both intensively and extensively, the rule of law would recede farther and farther into the background.

Planning is implied in socialism and the Congress Party has accepted socialism as the object of its endeavours. In a paper on 'The Implications of Socialist Pattern of Society', submitted at the Ooty Seminar on the Third Five Year Plan, Dr. V. K. R. V. Rao says⁵ that "once we understand and accept with understanding the implications of a socialist society, the rest becomes easier". And he gives the essence of this implication: "Socialism is not just a religion that one can accept on Sundays and ignore on week days (incidentally a poor understanding of religion) Socialism is different. If socialism is to be achieved, then it must function through all institutions. Hence, the need for drastic overhaul in our institutional framework as also in our human relations, if we are to build up a socialist society."6 This seems to be a correct assessment of socialism. It is not merely an economic ideology, but a way of life more comprehensive even than that of religion. Therefore for its successful implementation. human relations and social institutions are to be overhauled. The essential human relationship that has to be revised to accommodate socialism is that based on the liberty of the individual person. The institutional framework which has to be 'drastically overhauled' is that of democracy, for within that framework, socialism has no berth. I find myself in agreement with what de Tocqueville said in 18487: "Democracy extends the sphere of individual freedom, socialism restricts it. Democracy attaches all possible value to each man; socialism makes each man a mere agent, a mere number. Democracy and socialism have nothing in common but one word: equality. But notice the difference: while democracy seeks equality in liberty, socialism seeks equality in restraint and servitude." Therefore we cannot but agree with W. M.

^{5.} A.I.C.C. Economic Review, p. 39.

^{6.} Ibid.

^{7.} Quoted by Hayek, op. cit., p. 18.

Chamberlin⁸ that "Socialism achieved and maintained by democratic means seems definitely to belong to the world of utopias".

The history of socialist societies has been everywhere a history of the progressive decline of democratic institutions and disappearance of democratic values. They have tended to travel the 'road towards a totalitarian, purely negative, non-economic society of unfreedom and inequality'. A socialist economy would not be satisfied with leaving a significant sector of economic activity in the hands of private entrepreneurs. It would tend to monopolize economic power in the hands of the government. The division of the economy into private and public sectors is dictated by considerations of expediency, and not by the principles of socialism. When time and circumstances warrant socialism in India would show its true colour and would demand complete control over people's subsistence. And 'power over a man's subsistence is power over his will'. If control of all economic resources, and of everyone's employment were concentrated in the hands of government, political opposition would become impossible. With it would disappear all effective political choice and the guarantee of our Even where coercion is not openly practised, the suggestion that keeping a job depends on co-operation and conformity with the governmental policies and ideas would soon be enough to destroy independence. An essential condition for democracy therefore, is that there should be no absolute monopoly of economic power by the government. ...

Such a monopoly should not exist even by private sources. Capitalism in some of its phases is hostile to liberty and free enterprise. The impersonal character of large modern corporations and industrial monopolies do not deserve the name of 'private property' and 'free enterprise'. They represent a power of public magnitude and consequence which can be entrusted to individuals only as trustees of society to use it for the common good.

Democracy in India, or for that matter, in any country will survive only when economic power is made responsible through and through. It should not be grafted on to the coercive power of the state or be allowed to exist as a wholly independent field of private action, but must be brought within the sphere of community decision. The work of self-government does not stop short where

4

^{8.} Ibid., p. 21.

economic policy begins. Decisions about those economic matters which affect all our lives cannot be made at will by a few, whether officials or managers, without the consent of the rest. Ownership is a form of trusteeship — a power of acting — conferred by the community and it must be exercised on terms the community approves.

Finally, the basic condition of democracy is that it must be built upon the immutable and universal principle of morality, inherent in the nature of man. Where moral values are discarded, and the dignity of individual personality forgotten, it would be merely a matter of time for democracy to disappear. It is relevant to repeat what Tawney says with regard to economic reconstruction: "Both the existing economic order and too many of the projects advanced for reconstructing it break down through their neglect of their truism that, since even quite common men have souls, no increase in material wealth will compensate them for arrangements which insult their self-respect and impair their freedom. A reasonable estimate of economic organization must allow for the fact that unless industry is to be paralysed by recurrent revolts on the part of human nature, it must satisfy criteria which are not purely economic."

The preservation of democratic values and institutions would not be possible if we aim, at the same time, a reconstruction of the economy along planned lines to achieve ultimately a socialist society. This is not to deny the necessity of control. Social life would be anarchic without control. But control must aim at releasing the springs of individual initiative and enterprise directed towards the enrichment of society. Order and stability have to be established so that the economy may be enabled to serve the people. But the term 'order' conceals within it different degrees of freedom or servitude. There is one kind of order in a family, another in a fraternal society, a third kind in a prison-house and a fourth in a military division. The conception of the nature of order will depend upon the purpose that we ascribe to the institution which establishes and exercises order. The order in the state would therefore depend upon the purpose that the state seeks to achieve. And it is agreed on all hands that the purpose of a democratic

^{9.} R. H. Tawney: Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. (Pelican Edition.) p. 278.

state is to establish conditions congenial to the development of the personality of man in freedom. But in seeking to establish these conditions, the essential freedom of man is not to be destroyed. That is what has been happening in those societies which in their impatience to convert the world into a heaven for the body of man has made it a hell for his spirit. It is to be hoped that our country with the centuries-old tradition of 'Dharma' will not disown her inheritance in the fashionable craze after material mirages promised by socialism or any other 'ism' and thus destroy the essential values of humanity.

(The views expressed in this booklet do not necessarily represent the views of the Forum of Free Enterprise)

Free Enterprise was born with man and shall survive as long as man survives.

-A. D. Shroff

HAVE YOU: JOINED THE FORUM?

Annual Membership Fee is Rs. 10/-Bona fide students can get our booklets for a year by becoming Student Associates on payment of Rs. 2/-.

Published by M. R. Pai, for Forum of Free Enterprise, "Solrab House," 235, Dr. Dadabhai Naoroji Road, Bombay 1, and printed by S. Krishnamoorthy at Western Printers & Publishers, 15/23, Hamam Street, Bombay 1