India, the world’s largest democracy, recently concluded its general elections. The date of the election results 4th June 2024 coincided with the date of establishment of the Swatantra Party. The formations that emerged from this largest electoral exercise in the world have more in common with the Swatantra Party than just the date. One would correctly wonder what could be so similar between a recently concluded election and a political party that was founded sixty-five years ago. The Swatantra Party contributed immensely to Indian political and electoral thinking. Much of this invaluable treasure of ideas has remained hidden in the old Swatantra documents and souvenirs waiting for researchers, young and old, willing to explore them. This article discusses the timeless wisdom of the Swatantrites, especially for the opposition parties faced with a formidable ruling party or a ruling coalition.
Pragmatism of the Swatantra Party
The Swatantra Party had acquired a weird reputation for being too principled and politically promiscuous at the same time. It is more important to focus on the serious accusation of promiscuity.
A contemporary observer, Howard Erdman objected to the Swatantra Party’s decision to negotiate with all non-communist political parties including the right-wing parties to avoid a multi-cornered contest against the ruling Congress in the 1962 elections. To avoid a multi-cornered contest against the powerful Congress, the Swatantra Party negotiated with Ram Rajya Parishad, Bharatiya Jana Sangh and even Hindu Mahasabha. Swatantra Party had preferred to contest elections on its programme and yet it was ready to negotiate for the electoral arrangements.
Congress at the time was an amalgamation of ideologically divergent groups and interests. The flipside of this diversity was that ideologically the Congress stood for nothing specific. The Swatantra Party believed that the alternative to the then-dominant Congress had to be fundamentally different from Congress. In a democracy, parties and alliances must offer alternatives or choices to the voters through their programmes. The Swatantra Party held that there was a need for the polarisation of political parties based on principles and well-defined programmes and not on personalities or identities. Any attempt to create a consensus among all opposition parties was futile. It would not only create confusion but also lack a well-defined policy programme. (Masani, 1966a) Coming from this position the Swatantra Party was ready to cooperate to the maximum extent specifically with ‘like-minded’ parties. Thus, the Swatantra Party was willing to defer to other illiberal right-wing parties to maximise the chances of defeating the Congress.
Minoo Masani did not support the Swatantra-Hindu Mahasabha association in the Lok Sabha given the latter’s frank position on the communal issues. However, the other founding member of the Swatantra Party – Rajaji, was ready to ‘ally with the devil himself’ to defeat the Congress. (Erdman, 1963-1964) According to S. V. Raju, Masani and Rajaji were two liberals who agreed on nine out of ten things. Yet on an issue as crucial as the coalition policy of the Swatantra Party, they were rarely on the same page.
The Problem with the First-Past-the-Post System
The Swatantra Party diagnosed a problem in Indian democratic institutions. India adopted the first-past-the-post electoral system. This system is patterned after the British system. India has multiple political parties. According to Minoo Masani, the first-past-the-post electoral system evolved for countries with two-party systems. When only two candidates representing the two major political parties contest, the winner invariably garners support from the majority. However, abiding by the first-past-the-post rule in a multiparty democracy meant that an elected candidate would more often be the one whose performance was only marginally better than others and not necessarily the candidate who had the support of the majority of voters (above 50% votes) from his constituency. Latin American countries with multiparty systems had started moving away from the first-past-the-post system and adopted a system of majority run-offs as early as the 1960s. This meant that if no candidate won a clear majority in the first round of voting there would be another round of voting between the top two candidates from the first round.
The electoral system in India in a way compelled the Swatantra Party to enter into electoral arrangements with other democratic political parties in the opposition. The Swatantra Party preferred contesting elections under its own banner. But to put an end to the distortion of the popular will through the first-past-the-post system, it was necessary to eliminate the contest between opposition parties. The opposition parties had to resort to the ‘second ballot’ or a majority runoff among themselves in advance. (Masani, 1966b) This meant they had to gauge who from among them could win against the Indian National Congress in a given constituency.
Importance of Collective Action
Sohrab Batlivala, a Swatantrite, made an interesting observation about the 1967 state election results. Certain states in India had shown a marked preference for particular opposition parties and their respective ideologies. For instance, Tamil Nadu voted Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam to absolute power. Kerala voted for the Communists. Orissa elected a contingent of the Swatantra Party to its legislature. Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan had shown a liking for Bharatiya Jana Sangh.[1] There were very few states and regions without a well-organised opposition to the ruling Congress Party. Batlivala argued that these states could be strategically targeted by opposition parties. (Batlivala, 1971) A party like Bharatiya Jana Sangh could make inroads into Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir. Similarly, the Swatantra Party could extend its influence to the southern state of Andhra Pradesh. Doing this tactfully and with mutual agreement was indeed the right thing for the opposition parties willing to put an end to the dominance of Congress. The like-minded opposition parties could collectively decide to not poach on the preserves of one another and share the states as their exclusive areas of influence amongst themselves. This arrangement would result in the following scenario:
- Most of the states would immediately come under a two-party system consisting of only the ruling Congress and one opposition party.
- If a non-Congress opposition party succeeded in getting a majority in the state assembly without forming a coalition, it would form a compact and homogeneous ministry of its own. This was seen as a much better option than forming a United Front with disunited partners.
- The non-Congress Party would not have to get into the agonising task of forging the electoral adjustments with political rivals.
Only if the opposition parties had adopted this way, the people of India would have been able to judge these parties for their ability to govern well. It would have led to a real competition between the political parties to prove to the nation the intrinsic worth of their respective economic policies, programmes and ideologies. Had this plan of having one opposition party per state been carefully implemented, it would have substantially reduced the overall cost of conducting the election campaigns. Every party would have had a congenial area for itself against the ruling Congress. They would not have to worry about contesting a much larger number of legislative seats which strained their resources in uncongenial regions. Most of the opposition parties would have secured far more seats than by competing against several rivals, claimed Batlivala.
Further Batlivala observed four main divisions of nearly equal strength among the non-Congress opposition. Firstly, there was a Rightist group consisting of the Swatantra Party and the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. Secondly, there was a Middle or Centrist one consisting of the Opposition Congress or the Congress (O). Thirdly, there was a Leftist camp consisting of the Communists and the Socialist groups. Lastly, there was a motley crowd of various state parties and independents representing and advocating divergent views and policies on economic and political problems facing India. Such a heterogeneous and divided opposition would never be able to join hands to form a coalition to oust the ruling Congress from the seat of power.
According to Batlivala, the Congress could be stopped in the Lok Sabha if the opposition achieved at least one of the two things: (a) The opposition parties split up into Rightist and Leftist factions of nearly equal strength; or (b) The strength of the Congress was reduced to less than thirty percent of the entire membership of both Houses.
Conclusion
The Indian National Congress is no longer the dominant party. Most of the parties mentioned above have changed, have been replaced or have been rendered irrelevant. The Swatantra Party ceased to exist as early as the mid-1970s. However, some of these observations and ideas produced by the Swatantrites are valid even today. The political parties of today have gradually adopted these ideas after trial and error. When the opposition parties contesting against a common dominant ruling party fish in the same pond for the electorate, they inadvertently end up helping the dominant ruling party. This was evident during the Lok Sabha elections of 2014 and 2019 when the left-of-centre political parties such as the Samajwadi Party and the Indian National Congress contested against each other in Uttar Pradesh. This led to the victories of the Bharatiya Janata Party in two consecutive elections.
In the 2024 general elections, the Samajwadi Party entered into an arrangement with the Congress. The regional party (Samajwadi Party) in this case was able to persuade the much larger national party (Congress) to contest only 17 seats in Uttar Pradesh. The Samajwadi Party decided to contest 62 out of the 80 seats in Uttar Pradesh. This led to a direct contest between the Samajwadi Party / Indian National Congress on one side and the Bharatiya Janata Party on the other in each constituency. This trend is much wider and goes beyond Uttar Pradesh.
Swatantrites observed that the Indian multiparty system could create a strong government at the centre but it was incapable of putting such a government on leash. The electoral rules adopted by India were more suitable for the two-party system. The first-past-the-post rule would not be reformed as it benefitted the political parties across the board. If this electoral rule cannot be reformed, the Indian multiparty system has to be converted into a two-party system. Therefore, the Swatantra Party sought to convert the elections into a two-party contest unofficially. Indian parties in opposition and parties in power can learn a lot from Swatantra’s prescription and avoid distortion of popular will.
Notes:
- Other examples of the marked preference for regional parties included Akali Sikhs in Punjab, the new local Vishal Haryana Party in Haryana, the Peasants and Workers Party and Shiv Sena in Maharashtra.
References:
- Batlivala, S. H. (1971). Alternatives to Coalitions: United Fronts and Electoral Adjustments. Swatantra Party.
- Erdman, H. (1963-1964, Winter). India’s Swatantra Party. Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia, 36(4), 394-410.
- Masani, M. R. (1966a). Why Swatantra? Popular Prakashan.
- Masani, M. R. (1966b). The Socialist Pattern. In Congress Misrule and the Swatantra Alternative (pp. 1-40). Manaktalas, Bombay.