

DEMOCRACY IN INDIA

By

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INTRODUCTION

When the Forum of Free Enterprise came into existence, it emphasized the close inter-relationship between free enterprise and the democratic way of life. Though a commonly accepted concept, democracy lends itself to many interpretations and requires constant public discussion on its contents and realities. With a view, therefore, to stimulating public discussion on this subject, in 1959 the Forum of Free Enterprise announced an essay competition for the public on "Democracy in India". Three eminent men in public life, Mr. N. Dandekar I.C.S. (Retd.), Managing Director of A.C.C., Mr. Frank Moraes, Editor-in-Chief of "The Indian Express", and Prof. M. Ruthnaswamy, former Vice-Chancellor of Annamalai University and an authority on public administration, kindly consented to be the judges.

The essay which was awarded the first prize of Rs. 1,000 is presented in this booklet. Its author, Mr. J. M. Lobe Prabhu, is a retired member of the Indian Civil Service and a frequent contributor to the Indian Press.

**"People must come to accept private
enterprise not as a necessary evil,
but as an affirmative good."**

**—Eugene Black
President. World Bank**

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J. M. LOBO PRABHU

It is difficult to trace democracy in India until the British, to take the odour out of foreign rule, began, about sixty years ago, to vest power progressively in the people according to economic status in urban and rural areas. After independence with a juvenile enthusiasm, the Constituent Assembly raided every country for the latest and the best constitution. In the framework of the Act of 1935 and on the British principles of the Rule of Law and the Sovereignty of the Parliament, the equality of the people has been established in meticulous detail. Like all schemes of men and mice, the results have not followed the expectations. In the name of democracy, the country now lies bound with restrictions which even the British did not dare impose. At least five sets of causes have operated, first, the deficiencies of the Constitution, second, the growth of usages, contrary to the Constitution, third, the quality of the legislative and executive parts of the Constitution, fourthly, the weakness of the organs of freedom, and lastly, the ignorance and incapacity of the people.

Constitutions are based on the body of accepted social and economic principles. After considering the alternative of calling it a Socialist Republic, the Constituent Assembly declared India to be a Sovereign Democratic Republic. Nonetheless at Avadi in 1955 the Congress decided to adopt the Socialist Pattern and have since imposed redistributive taxation and are determined to impose State trading and co-operative farming, the fundamentals of the Socialist Republic of the Soviets. The definite antithesis between socialism and democracy has not been appreciated. Socialism is based on the interests of the State, democracy on the interests of the individual. Democracy builds from below, Socialism from the top. To the extent, the State assumes ownership of the means

of production, which is the basis of Socialism, the individuals become employees, with little power to order their work or lives and less interest in their capacities or contributions. Where State ownership is complete, no competitive standards are left, where partial, the competition is unfair to private enterprise which has less authority and finance. The Avadi resolution*therefore affected the ethos of the Constitution, eviscerating it completely of its spirit and partly of its provisions. As a result the people have steadily lost political power which is being polarised in fewer and fewer individuals. This might be in accordance with the traditions of the people but not the principles of democracy on which it was sought to base the Constitution.

An examination of the Constitution shows that its contradictions are susceptible of the polarisation which has taken place. The Constitution opens with a catalogue of Fundamental Rights of which only two are parents of the others, Article 14 assuring equality before the law irrespective of religion, race, sex and residence, and Article 17 assuring freedom of opinion and action. The elaboration in other Articles is generally limiting of the basic rights. Thus under Article 13, the door is opened for subordinate legislation by the inclusion of "orders, rules, regulations and notifications" in the category of laws made by the legislature. Even as early as 1929, Lord Hewett in his book *New Despotism* had castigated the bypassing of the legislature through official rule making and administrative tribunals because it contravened the Rule of Law which, according to Dicey, means "equal subjection of all to the ORDINARY LAW of the land, administered by the ORDINARY LAW COURTS". Both in the Centre and the States, the rules made by Government in numerous Acts are more extensive than the laws made by the legislature. Similarly decisions of Administrative Tribunals and Government are tending to outnumber those of the Courts. Article 16 limits equality by allowing preference in public employment to the backward classes. However desirable it may be to advance these classes, their employment in public services without reference to their merits must affect the quality of the administration on which the advancement of the whole country and the interests of individuals are dependent. Article 17 which assures seven freedoms is restrictive of the Freedom of Speech which can be placed out of the jurisdiction of Courts

by the claim of the security of the State. This power can be exercised by local and other authorities. In U.S.A. and U.K. the courts can examine the grounds of security and so ensure that the administration does not gag its opponents. In respect of all seven freedoms, the State can impose restrictions with reference to previous legislations and reasonable grounds. The exemption in favour of existing laws confirms the heritage of the laws of the preceding foreign rule and the laws hastily passed on promises made by the Congress Party before coming into power like zamindari abolition. Particularly in respect of the right to property, the power of the State to impose restrictions in the interests of the general public specially with reference to Article 39 is destructive of the freedom assured. It opens the door to expropriation on grounds which the courts may be competent to examine but unwilling to overlook according to the political atmosphere of the time. The right to trade and industry has been further curtailed by the First Amendment which has enabled the State to place restrictions, which the courts cannot question, if the purpose is of nationalisation. Few have realised the blow this has implied to democracy. The law is now ready made for the communists to order the life and work of everyone in any degree and on any terms. No one can legally resist the communisation of land, industry or trade, of units big or small. Even before the Avadi session and only one year after the Constitution, the Congress had laid the foundations of the Socialist State by the First Amendment of the Constitution.

Article 22 enables the State to enforce preventive detention for three months and such further period as the Parliament may provide. Though the law of England allowed preventive detention during the period of the war, analogous provisions cannot be traced in the constitutions of other countries. No doubt the person detained can obtain a Writ of Habeas Corpus from the High Courts, but they are not allowed to consider the facts but only the grounds of detention.

Article 25 after reaffirming freedom of religion proceeds to subject it to the laws already in existence and to grounds "economic, financial, political and social welfare and reform". There is no parallel to this in the constitutions of other countries, which give full freedom to religion subject only to the criminal laws

of the country. However laudable it may be to make religion conform to current theories, there is first an unwarranted interference in what is personal and second, scope for secularisation which under a communist government can mean atheism. Even the right to propagate religion which was conceded to Christians to give up their claims to separate representation has not prevented the banning of foreign missionaries, though other foreigners with worse intents are welcome. The provisions of the Article leave all religions at the mercy of the ideologies of the reigning government. The changes in the laws of marriage and succession and in the management of temples and endowment, however desirable, were for the Hindus themselves to make, according to the pleasure or pressure of those concerned. What has been forced is generally resented and frequently evaded.

Article 30 assures minorities, whether based on language or religion, the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice without discrimination in respect of State aid. In Kerala the Education Act can force teachers and books, which the minorities abhor, while even in the model State of Madras, grants are withheld from private schools which do not agree to give free primary education. Various experiments in the medium of instruction, the subjects of study, the method of teaching, including the basic pattern, have been forced on schools destroying standards they had built up for years. The Article therefore is a dead letter because of the overwhelming power of the State and the helpless position of educational institutions.

Article 31 destroys the sanctity of private property because while all constitutions allow that land may be acquired only on payment of due compensation, it makes an exception to all expropriative laws passed eighteen months before the date of the constitution. The First Amendment overcame the legal defects in this provision while the Fourth Amendment has empowered the Government to fix a scale of compensation which no court can question. The right to property therefore lies in ruins. Many serious consequences arise, first, the Constitution has become a tattered piece of paper, second, the door has been opened to communism, third, the bureaucracy has been further empowered, and fourth, a neurotic impulse has been imparted to the economy making property a matter of hide and seek. Since democracy has been allowed to

taste blood like this, the overwhelming majority of those without property will increasingly abort the Constitution and expropriate the rights of others. This will be more so if joint farming and State trading obliterate the rights of millions of small owners and dealers and throw them into the ranks of those who have no property. It will then be a short step for the State to assume ownership of all the means of production.

This raises the question of the necessity of free enterprise for the survival of democracy. State enterprise is both economically and politically restrictive. Economically State enterprise replaces the natural and widespread initiative and interest of individuals by the indifference and inexperience of officials. Whatever compulsions may be organized or compensations offered, the human spirit responds less to what it cannot directly own and enjoy. There is ample evidence of this in the existing State services and enterprises. In public offices, the officials think only of themselves and not of the public they should serve because even the best of them cannot connect what each does with what results in the intangible total. In public enterprises this lack of personal interest is heightened because there is no equivalent to the control exercised in private enterprises by the shareholders who watch their dividends and by the consumers who watch the prices. Consequently our State enterprises are commercially failures, the return, for instance, on investment of the Centre in 1958 being only 1 per cent. This means, first, that the loans taken by Government pay an interest at least three times as much as they earn, second, that these loans are diversions from private enterprise, third, that to the extent State enterprise displaces private enterprise, it disengages private capital and employment, fourth, that taxes required to pay interest on loans and support party programmes like khadi, basic education, prohibition, co-operation cripple production and boost prices, and lastly, the increased national production on which economic democracy as a counterpart of political democracy depends is unnecessarily reduced. It is because no notice is taken of the disastrous results of existing nationalisation, that the danger from more of it is not realised. Politically, State enterprise converts free men into employees of the State with no right to agitate against it. Already employment of the State has swallowed up so many men of the best quality that politics get mostly

those who are disappointed. In total State ownership, individual freedom of opinion will be eliminated, leadership being polarised to those who can command the experts in control. In any case when men have no stake of their own, politics can have only academic interest. One of the causes for such polarisation of power as has already taken place is the elimination of political identity of the increasing numbers employed by the State.

In the face of this, Article 31 allowing the citizen to move the Supreme Court for prerogative writs appears hollow. The Government is also learning to manoeuvre out of the reach of writs by legislation with retrospective effect. Further, the courts are being increasingly influenced by the various Directive Principles, which are being used to justify departure from the strict letter of the law.

The Directive Principles are an innovation, the only precedent being the Constitution of Eire. They are declared not to be enforceable in any court of law but nevertheless to be fundamental to the governance of the country. In effect they are the inchoate ideologies of the Congress to which have been added ingredients of socialism, which appear innocuous but can be insidious of much harm. Article 38 provides that the welfare of the people should be secured by a suitable order of justice, social, economic and political as if the elaboration of Fundamental Rights did not do this already. Article 39 is more dangerous, particularly the provisions that the material resources of the community should be so distributed to subserve the common good and second that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the detriment of common good. In the first place, this contravenes the fundamental rights to property and employment. In the second place, it is the source of redistributive taxation, estate duties, wealth tax, expenditure tax, capital gains tax, which are expropriative of the body and not merely of the income from property. The consequences are at least twofold, first, that property loses its character according to its size which not only destroys incentive but encourages evasion. What is forgotten is that he who owns much has done so largely by saving. Investment implies a sacrifice of current consumption, which the State should encourage for increasing enterprise and employment which is to the benefit of the country and the vast

class of unemployed. If on ethical grounds, extravagance of the few requires to be reduced taxation on expenditure and consumption may be justified, which would also cause diversion of income to investments. In respect of evasions, the Minister for Finance himself admitted that a very small part of the income tax due was recovered. This not only leads to immobilisation of capital, which cannot be openly employed but to corruption on one hand and wasteful expenditure on the other. The economy is therefore suffering, on one hand, from a tendency to neurotism, and on the other, from a habit of dishonesty to a degree unknown in other countries. The decline in industrialisation which has taken place can be traced to measures of taxation which ignore fundamental rights and instincts. In the second place, the bias against concentration of wealth ignores the advantages of large-scale production, which assures better conditions for workers and lower prices for consumers. By the Third Amendment the Government have themselves taken the right of monopoly. If private monopoly is considered economically adverse to the interests of consumers the Government have the right to fix prices and the means of buying accordingly for sale to the public. In any case, there has been no approach to monopoly conditions in any industry and the provision against it is an act of tilting at windmills, which disturbs and distorts investment. The power of the State to interfere in private enterprise induces a measure of subservience, of which the large contributions by capitalists, irrespective of their political opinions, to election expenses are one of the signs. The subservience also contributes to the polarisation of power in the Government which is antithetical to democracy.

Article 41, which enjoins provision for the right to work, and Article 43, which provides for a living wage, are important as a measure of economic democracy. Unfortunately the Government have started at the opposite end of making the rich poor without thinking of giving the poor the means to live and work. The Director of the Tata School of Social Studies has recently computed that there are 45 millions, one-third of the working population, who are unemployed. Living wage has been secured for only about two millions in notified industries while agricultural and other workers who number 80 millions are lucky to get a third of the minimum wages. Full employment will add to the wealth of

the country, while minimum wages will imply additions to purchasing power which will benefit the secondary and tertiary sector also.

Article 47 provides for the introduction of prohibition. Like khadi, village handicrafts, this is part of the Congress ideology. The first question is, Is Congress, a party whose membership is less than one per cent of the population, entitled through a Constituent Assembly nominated by it to make its ideas a part of the permanent constitution? In respect of prohibition those who do not *ex hypothesi* drink should not be competent to judge or decide for others who do. So far 40 per cent of the country has been covered by prohibition with a loss of revenue, calculated by the Prohibition Committee at 44 crores of rupees annually. If the whole country is covered, the loss for the Second Plan period will be at least 500 crores of rupees which is more than the cost of all other items in the Plan, except industries and railways. The gain has been negligible. The Committee admitted that 25 per cent of the addicts, that is about 8 millions, continue to drink illicitly with injury not only to their health but to their respect for the law. The small number convicted become regular criminals from their associations in jail, since imprisonment is now compulsory in many States. This Directive Principle therefore has gratuitously created crime on one hand and thrown away revenue on the other. It has trespassed on a right which people have in other countries and had in the past in this country, reducing their food on one hand and their enjoyment of life on the other.

The basic principle therefore of the Rule of Law to assure the freedom of the individual has been obscured by the Constitution, its amendments and usages. The position is worse than under the British who did not interfere in personal preferences and relationships. It is a sad commentary on the state of public opinion that no one has examined the Constitution as it was framed and amended with reference to the loss of rights involved. If this is a reflection of the polarisation of power it is also the cause of it. No doubt full democracy to a people who for centuries had known foreign or oppressive rule postulated for many restraints but these should have been within the framework of freedom and justice to all classes. The Constitution has begun an erosion, of which the result may be the end of democracy. A further com-

plication, which other countries have been spared, has been the heritage of passive resistance to the laws. In the face of meticulous provisions to redress all grievances, picketing, hartals, and strikes are the basic instrument of those who wish to avoid the arbitrament of laws; so far, except in respect of labour strikes, the Congress Government had repudiated passive resistance. In Kerala, now their attitude is different because they are in opposition. It is not recognized that passive resistance can only succeed if the Government admits the inadequacy of its own laws. The simple law, Section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code, provides for bonds for keeping the peace, which if demanded from the organizers from the moment of their announcement of agitations nearly always ends them. Seldom do the organizers care to appear in criminal courts and never are they willing to be financially responsible for the actions of their followers or opponents, which can be traced to their incitement. Similarly, prosecution for attempted suicide ends hunger strikes. It is only because governments are unwilling to use their powers or serve their interests that childish displays become dignified as popular movements.

The second basic principle of democracy, that of the Sovereignty of the Parliament, is also not fully served by the Constitution. No one seems to have realized that the Constitution is a patchwork of contradictions in which the supremacy of the Parliament is not a provision, being at best only a presumption arising from British principles which underlay the Act of 1935. While therefore the intention was to have a parliamentary form of government, the provision has been of the presidential form. The powers of the President are defined in the identical terms used in the American Constitution, which gives him and his officers all the executive power of government, the Council of Ministers from the legislature being confined to "aiding and advising" him. He is also a part of the legislature, Parliament being defined under Article 73 as the President and the two houses. While the powers of the houses are not defined those of the President are affirmed in every relevant provision and may not be altered by the Parliament. He appoints the Prime Minister and other Ministers and may re-move them. Though he is bound to summon the Parliament twice a year, he can prorogue and dissolve it at any time. He alone can **cause** the budget to be presented and his assent is necessary for all bills.

In emergency conditions, he can pass Ordinances and sanction expenditure on his own authority. Parliament has only two powers against him, first, it can reaffirm a bill which he has asked to be reconsidered, second, it can remove him by a two-thirds majority. In actual practice, all his powers are exercised by the Prime Minister and the ministers in his name, though there is no warrant for this except British practice and the assumption that this overrides the letter of the Constitution. The British King no doubt is only a constitutional head but this is not in conflict with the constitution because the British have no written one. In all other constitutions which are written there is no difference between the statutory and actual powers of the President. What is true of the President is also true of the Governors whose statutory powers are being exercised by the elected ministers.

There are therefore foundations of a conflict, which can arise according to the personalities of the President and Governors or the balance of parties supporting them. The Congress from an unjustified sense of its immortality has been indifferent whether the power is exercised by the Prime Minister or the President selected by it. In the neighbouring countries of Burma, Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia and Sudan the Presidents have eliminated the Prime Ministers with the help of the army. It is open to us to avoid this by one of three courses, first, by amending the **Constitution** to clarify that the President's position is **only** titular. This may be open to the objection that the country cannot afford titular positions of great expenditure. It may also make the office of the President and Governors even more unattractive than at present. The second course is to allow the President to enjoy his statutory powers of being the sole executive of the State with outstanding personalities selected by him in charge of the powers now exercised by elected ministers. This has several advantages, first, that the conflict between usage and law will be eliminated, second, that there will be greater stability of policy and greater security for the services, third, that the principle of the separation of the executive and legislative powers will end the polarisation of power in elected ministers and the elected members who support them. It has not been realized that the present system makes for a dictatorship because the salutary system of balance between the legislature and executive is suspended. The ministers are a law unto **themselves**,

with the administration under them and the legislature with them. Though the administration gains protection it loses its independence at the same time. This can account for the corruption and **inefficiency** which have increased. It can also account for many of the irresponsible policies which characterise the present Government. Few elected ministers have the qualifications and hardly any have the experience of **administration** to make them heads of it. Their British predecessors in India had a lifetime experience of administration while their counterparts in England allow the permanent civil services the power which they alone are trained to exercise. Our ministers, who according to the Constitution may **only** aid and advise the President, assume not only his powers but those of the trained civil servants. Their supporters are an extension of their executive powers, lobbying at headquarters and interfering with the administration in their constituencies. For a cleaner, more **efficient administration** the legislature and the executive require to be separated to check and balance each other. The Constitution therefore to the extent that it empowers our President like the American President has erred, if at all, in the right direction. The third course, which is perhaps the only one possible, in view of the vested interests of the legislators, which have grown up, may be to allow the President and Governors to assume some of their powers like presiding at **cabinet** meetings, appointing some experts who are not legislators as ministers and otherwise limiting the abuses in the combination of legislative and executive powers. In any case, the whole position which has escaped attention not **only** of the Constituent Assembly but of all governments and **jurists** deserves rectification either of law or usage.

A second reason for the polarisation of power in the ministers is the quality of the members of Parliament. In deciding for adult franchise it was not realized that the population of India fell into different corridors of time, varying from the first to the twentieth century to whom democracy has varying degrees of meaning. All have respect for **authority**; few understand their own share **in** it, under a democracy. None has capacity to know the intricate problems of a large modern State. Elections therefore turn on caste or local loyalties. Leaders and parties may be recognized but this is **in** an emotional way. The power in the people for governance therefore is generally **uninformed** and frequently misdirected so

that democracy is merely the physical casting of votes, which the money, influence and efforts of the candidates can organize. The candidates on their part have to depend on the party because few have the finance to organize the large constituencies. The parties in their turn depend for funds on rich interests which fear them. The legislator is therefore a product of money and organization on one side and ignorance and prejudice on the other, with little merit and no independence. He is compensated by increasing emoluments and is rarely concerned with the interests of the country which he leaves to his bosses or the interests of his constituents which are in any case difficult to improve. A system of indirect elections to the legislatures could have thrown up representatives capable of making real contributions to the governance of the country.

A third factor for polarisation of power is the party system. It disciplines the legislators not only to its ideas but to its leaders.

The interests of the country are only secondary. In the absence of the separation of legislative and executive powers this means that the Government is dependent on a very small number of persons and ideas. The party sessions are more decisive than the Government and the party leaders exercise more powers than the cabinet. The fact that the basic ideas of the Congress arise from the struggle for independence and its new ideas are only related to survival in power has meant a process of outbidding the communists who alone have a body of integrated ideas. Incidentally, this also tends to the polarisation of power which is the core of communist strength.

A fourth factor for the increase in power of the ministers is the quality of the services. The judiciary is fairly independent though the Law Commission suggested that there are also cracks in it. It is however circumvented by amending legislation, often with retrospective effect to overcome transgressions of the Constitution and of the laws. The executive has become camp followers of the Ministers with interest neither in their work nor the people. No doubt appointments are made by Public Service Commissions, though even here, governments have three means of evasion, first, of **excluding** posts of their choice from the purview of the Commissions, second, of making **temporary appointments** and pressing the acceptance of the *fait accompli*, and third, of

influencing the Commissions through the official co-opted to sit with them. But it is through postings and promotions that **the Government** subdues the administration. In the same grade, an official can hold a post with special authority, pay or allowances or special advantages of location at the discretion of the Government. For instance, a Collector can be kept in his own post on a maximum of Rs. 2,230 or in the post of Secretary to Government of India on Rs. 4,000 according as the Government is disposed towards him. In effect those in the highest posts are so precariously placed, that they are the least independent, which has an effect on the whole administration. In respect of promotions there is no appeal in appointments to selection posts. The Government have also discovered a new method of avoiding appeals, in the creation of new posts for their favourites with their own line of succession. In subordinate posts, the Governments have their way through the appointing authorities who fear them in their own interests. Never was government service so precarious and for that reason more subservient or inefficient. The inefficiency is partly due to the futile nature of much of the newly created work and staff. No one looks for results so long as the prescribed reports are sent to Government. In the Madars State, each Collectorate sends 25 periodical statements daily, a total of 6240 in the year which no one reads at either end. The public is played off with delay unless it is prepared to pay. So many new laws have been enacted touching the life and work of everyone, that the staff have made an art of delay to emphasize their importance or fill their pockets. For instance, under the Madras Tree Protection Act no one may lop a tree without sanction of the **Collector**, which it may take months to obtain, if at all; under Municipal byelaws the slightest alteration may not be made except with sanction **which** may be delayed for years. Permits for controlled commodities, export and import, industries and foreign exchange, electric or water connection can only be obtained by personally importuning a whole line of officials. In the name of the welfare state, the private individual has been reduced to subservience even to obtain his own rights. The staff shows no fear because it is **protected by** its superiors who are in **turn** protected by the Ministers. **If** the executive was with the Presidents and **Governors**, the **legislature**

would have protected the interest of the public and not of the administration. Democracy has therefore been sacrificed to legislature which want ministers from their numbers, who can favour them and protect the administration.

The fifth factor for **the** suppression of democracy has been the Press. It failed in its duty to examine the consequences of the Constitution and its amendments and has since ignored the trespass of the State in the private life and work of the people. To some extent this may be due to the immaturity of our journalism but to a greater extent it is due to the tendency of the managements to avoid **annoying** the Government, which dispenses favours like advertisements, import permits and restraints on labour and staff. There may have also been a natural tendency to support the reputation of our new leaders and governments to earn good opinion abroad. The result however is the sacrifice of the common man and the interests of the country.

The sixth factor is the ill-formed character of public opinion. There is a general tendency to place Government above even private discussion. This may be due partly to the fear of Government which in some way or other touches the life and work of nearly everyone. It is however due largely, on one hand, to the absence of information, papers reporting out barely examining the speeches and measures of Government, and on the other, to the absence of forums for discussion on the actual working of the administration. It may be that now the adulation for the Congress has worn down a little, the papers will be more critical. For local administration, it could be made the duty of the Collector to assemble all heads of departments once a month at headquarters to answer the complaints and consider the suggestions of the public invited to participate. This revives the Greek and Roman Forums giving democracy a means of aligning bureaucracy to its current needs and aspirations.

Democracy, like independence, came too easily to the country, without the integration which comes from gradual evolution. On close examination the Constitution appears to be uncoordinated in its provisions and pregnant for dangerous interpretations. While the Congress is still in overwhelming power, it should clear the field for democracy. Whether the presidential or parliamentary form is elected, all provisions should be accordingly aligned so

that no footholds remain for trouble when parties come to be more nicely balanced. In respect of economic and social policy if this is to be given a place in the Constitution it may be provided that the State will only do what the people cannot do, subject to the protection of weaker sections and the necessity to increase the total production of the country. It may be sufficient if the State ensures the right to employment and to a minimum wage by two courses, first, by stimulating private enterprise for raising the standard of living, and second, by organizing work in State projects like roads, reservoirs, buildings and new forests for those who cannot find private employment. This will mean economic democracy without expropriating anyone or detracting from the natural evolution of the economy. There would be no invasion of personal liberty, while the competence assured will make everyone viable to the position he deserves. Finance for this scheme of Insurance for Employment will be self-generating and can in any case be found by diversion from many wasteful items in the present plans. In respect of increasing production, the discipline necessary should be left to the people themselves through the panchayats, which the Constitution has provided. If the revenue and state help which the panchayats will receive is calibrated to their enforcement of the prescribed discipline, a new sense of collective responsibility will come to our villages to produce what is in their capacity and to enjoy what is within their limits. Neither co-operative farming or State trading will be necessary to ensure the food supplies the country needs. Within the framework of democracy the needs of the individual and of the country will be satisfied.

(The views expressed in this booklet do not necessarily represent the views of the Forum of Free Enterprise.)

**Free Enterprise was born with man and
shall survive as long as man survives.**

—A. D. Shroff

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