The Indian Attitude to the Soviet Union and the Position of the Communist Party of India after the Chinese attack

Summary

These seminar notes record M. R. Masani’s analysis of Indian public opinion toward the Soviet Union and of the Communist Party of India after the 1962 Chinese attack. He describes widespread Indian appreciation for rapid Western assistance, contrasted with disappointment at the Soviet Union’s initially pro-China position. Masani presents the Indian Communist Party’s November 1962 resolution defending India against Chinese aggression as both a tactical effort to avoid proscription and an attempt to secure positions in government-sponsored Defence Committees. He recounts the subsequent arrests of Communists, the party’s internal division between pro-Peking and more Moscow-oriented elements, and the pressure exerted by Moscow and Peking on the Indian leadership.

The notes then connect foreign-policy shifts to domestic politics and economic policy. Masani argues that Indian opinion toward Moscow improved because of Soviet support on Kashmir, closer Soviet-American positions, the 1963 trade agreement, and possible military assistance, while warning that India should not become dependent on either bloc. He advocates Western assistance for India’s territorial self-defence but recommends a policy of non-irritation and non-provocation toward the Soviet Union. In the discussion, he emphasizes agricultural and infrastructural needs over further concentration on heavy industry, criticizes the economic consequences of population growth and slow development, and predicts that the Sino-Indian conflict, the Kashmir dispute, and the Communist Party’s internal struggle will remain unresolved for some time.

Key points

• Masani divides the subject into the events of the Chinese attack and developments after the cease-fire.
• Indian public opinion welcomed Western assistance but resented the Soviet Union’s initial fence-sitting and support for China.
• The Communist Party of India’s November resolution is presented as a tactical umbrella against suppression and as a response to the danger of repeating its isolation in 1942.
• The party experienced continuing conflict between pro-Peking and pro-Moscow tendencies, with Dange’s position repeatedly shifting.
• Masani attributes improved Indian attitudes toward Moscow to Soviet support on Kashmir and increasingly friendly economic and strategic relations.
• He recommends non-irritation toward the Soviet Union while accepting Western aid and seeking military supplies from democratic countries.
• The discussion stresses agricultural investment, infrastructure, technical education, and electrical power rather than an exclusive emphasis on heavy industry.
• Masani expects no early settlement of either the Sino-Indian or Kashmir disputes and doubts that the Communist Party will formally split soon.