Freedom First

Summary

Freedom First issue 210 (November 1969) is a monthly opinion periodical from Bombay’s Democratic Research Service, edited by V. B. Karnik, built around commentary on the unraveling of United Front (U.F.) coalition governments in Kerala and West Bengal, the CPI-CPM split, and India’s foreign-policy standing. In the rendered pages, contributors examine the fall of the Namboodiripad ministry in Kerala and the parallel crisis in West Bengal as products of deliberate Communist (especially CPM) ‘united front’ tactics aimed at eliminating rival left and centrist allies; India’s diplomatically awkward attempt to gain observer status at the Rabat Islamic Summit; a twenty-year retrospective on the failures of Maoist China; a review of the Gajendragadkar National Commission on Labour report; and a satirical first-person imagining of Ho Chi Minh reflecting on Vietnam War diplomacy. The issue closes with a ‘With Many Voices’ press-quotes digest, a books-received list, and a subscription coupon, all consistent with the magazine’s classical-liberal, anti-Communist editorial line.

Essays

U. F. Collapse in Kerala

By V. B. Karnik

V. B. Karnik’s lead article analyzes the collapse of the Namboodiripad United Front ministry in Kerala, arguing the proximate cause was mutual corruption charges among ministers but the deeper cause was the CPM’s domineering effort to grow its own strength at its allies’ expense, a tactic he says is also playing out in West Bengal against the Bangla Congress and other partners. He contends that non-Communist democrats have failed to seize the political opportunity created by the U.F.’s failure, and closes by arguing that democracy itself is what allows Communists to build opposition and force ministries out via vote rather than violence — a fact he says the CPM leadership resents.

• The Namboodiripad U.F. ministry in Kerala fell over inter-party corruption charges, but the underlying cause was the CPM’s drive to weaken its coalition partners using government machinery.
• The CPM is accused of running the identical strategy in West Bengal against its allies, including the Bangla Congress.
• Non-Communist democratic parties are criticized for being too weak and divided to capitalize on the U.F.’s failures.
• The author frames the U.F. collapse as a missed opportunity for democrats to reintegrate around democratic plans and policies.
• Democracy is presented as the very mechanism that let non-CPM allies outvote and check the CPM, which Communists resent because it thwarts their bid for one-party rule.

Behind The Rabat Fiasco

By Aziz Madni

Aziz Madni’s piece dissects the ‘Rabat Fiasco,’ in which the Indian delegation to the Islamic Summit Conference at Rabat was seated only as observers and effectively humiliated after President Yahya Khan of Pakistan reversed course on admitting them. Madni argues India’s government had craved the invitation for dubious diplomatic reasons — to outflank Pakistan and appease President Nasser — and had chosen a Muslim minister, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, to lead the delegation for domestic political reasons connected to Mrs. Gandhi’s presidential-election maneuvering, only to be rebuffed once news of communal violence in Gujarat reached the conference. He closes by citing Jayaprakash Narayan’s view that India, being neither a Hindu nor Muslim country, had no business seeking a place at a purely Muslim summit.

• India sought and received a belated invitation to the Rabat Islamic Summit, reportedly to counter Pakistani diplomatic gains and respond to a Nasser appeal.
• President Yahya Khan’s ‘volte face’ on the second day, driven by news of communal violence in Gujarat, left the Indian delegation with only observer status.
• Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed’s selection to lead the delegation is tied to his usefulness in mobilizing Muslim MPs’ votes for President Giri’s election, benefiting Mrs. Gandhi.
• Madni concludes India’s West Asia policy should be based on a more realistic assessment of India’s acceptability there as a non-Muslim outsider.
• Jayaprakash Narayan is quoted calling India’s participation bid ‘a stupid thing to do’ since India is a country of Indians, not a Hindu or Muslim state.

China-Twenty Years Of Communist Rule

By Adam Adil

Adam Adil surveys twenty years of Communist rule in China, arguing that early hopes of a benign transformation gave way to recognition of an atrocious totalitarianism. He traces the Sino-Soviet friendship of the first decade (Soviet-modeled planning, constitution, and military), its collapse after 1956 as Mao denounced ‘Khrushchevist revisionists,’ and the disasters of the Great Leap Forward’s commune system and the Cultural Revolution’s Red Guard upheavals, which China has yet to recover from economically. The essay assesses China’s declining international standing (in Africa, Asia, and among Communist states, with Albania its only remaining ally), its comparatively weak military and stagnating economy despite its 1969 nuclear test, and closes with a warning that India must remain vigilant of pro-China sympathizers at home given Peking’s friendship with Pakistan and demonstrated capacity to foment subversion abroad.

• The first decade of Chinese Communist rule (1949-1959) was marked by close Sino-Soviet alliance and Soviet-modeled institutions; this broke down after 1956 amid Mao’s denunciation of ‘Khrushchevist revisionists.’
• The Great Leap Forward’s commune system (from 1958) and the subsequent Cultural Revolution’s Red Guard turmoil are presented as the source of China’s economic and social devastation.
• China’s international standing has declined across Asia and Africa; Albania is described as China’s only remaining ally of consequence.
• China’s military is assessed as defensively capable but lacking large-scale offensive capability, with an aging air force and light naval strength despite its 2.5-million-man army.
• The author warns that India must stay vigilant against domestic sympathizers of Mao Tse-tung given China’s friendship with Pakistan and its record of subversion in other countries.

Crisis In U. F. Ministries

By “Atreya”

Writing under the byline ‘Atreya,’ this essay argues that the crises engulfing the United Front ministries in Kerala and West Bengal reflect a deliberate, textbook Communist strategy of forming united fronts only to isolate and ‘liquidate’ allies one by one, with the CPM using ‘United Front from Below’ tactics against Right Communists in Kerala and against the Bangla Congress and Ajoy Mukherjee in West Bengal. The author details how control of the Home portfolio and police lets the CPM neutralize rivals, predicts a probable compromise (such as a Cabinet Sub-Committee curbing CPM control of Home) rather than ministry dissolution since none of the U.F. parties want the Presidential Rule that dissolution would trigger, and concludes that the crises in both states do not represent any strengthening of democracy.

• The essay frames Communist united-front strategy as a calculated tactic to isolate and eliminate the strongest rival ally before turning on the rest, quoting a ‘famous last words’ epitaph about parties that trusted they could contain the Communists.
• In Kerala, the Marxist Communist Party (CPM) pursued ‘United Front from Below’ against the Right Communists; in West Bengal, the same tactic targets the Bangla Congress and Chief Minister Ajoy Mukherjee.
• Control of the Home portfolio and police apparatus is identified as key to the CPM’s ability to neutralise its United Front partners.
• The author predicts neither resignation nor dismissal will resolve the crisis, since all U.F. parties fear the Presidential Rule that ministry dissolution would bring; a Cabinet Sub-Committee curbing CPM control of Home is floated as a likely compromise.
• The piece closes by warning that Chinese sympathy for Pakistan and pro-Mao sentiment among some Indian parties pose a subversion risk that India must guard against.

National Commission On Labour

By R. Muthuswamy

R. Muthuswamy reviews the report of the National Commission on Labour, headed by Justice Gajendragadkar, which made 299 recommendations on labour affairs and industrial relations — the first such commission in independent India. The essay discusses the Commission’s ‘threefold test’ derived from Constitutional Directive Principles, its comparison with Britain’s Donovan Commission, its stance against craft unions in favour of industrial unions and amalgamated bargaining agents, its proposed minimum-membership thresholds for union registration, and its two headline recommendations: compulsory recognition of a representative union under central law, and statutory definition of unfair labour practices by both employers and unions, alongside new National and State Industrial Relations Commissions to arbitrate disputes only as a last resort after voluntary bargaining fails.

• The Gajendragadkar Commission made 299 recommendations, the first labour commission appointed in independent India, judged against a constitutional ‘threefold test.’
• The Commission favours industrial unions over craft unions but recommends special committees within industrial unions to protect craft/trade interests in sectors like Railways, Posts & Telegraphs, and Aircraft.
• Minimum union membership for registration is recommended at 10% (minimum 7) of the workforce or 100, whichever is lower, with a monthly membership fee of at least one rupee.
• Key recommendations include compulsory union recognition under central law, statutory definition of unfair labour practices by both employers and unions, and creation of National and State Industrial Relations Commissions.
• Adjudication is envisioned as a last resort only, preserving voluntary bargaining and arbitration as the primary mechanisms, with a mandatory notice period and strike ballot requirement before industrial action.

Next Phase Of ‘Class Struggle’ (Bengal Report)

By Analyst

Under the ‘Bengal Report’ rubric and byline ‘Analyst,’ this essay covers the month (16 September-15 October 1969) in West Bengal politics, centering on the Bangla Congress’s resolution — adopted under Chief Minister Ajoy Mukherjee — condemning the deteriorating law-and-order situation and threatening a Gandhian satyagraha, widely read as targeting the CPM’s control of the Home portfolio held by Deputy Chief Minister Jyoti Basu. The author links the resolution’s timing to Mukherjee’s Delhi meeting with Indira Gandhi and traces the immediate objective (stripping Home from the CPM) against Basu’s public dismissal of the law-and-order concerns, predicting an eventual compromise via a Cabinet Sub-Committee rather than ministry collapse, and warns that the approaching harvest season threatens serious clashes between cultivators occupying land and its owners, with CPM ministers directing police and administration to favour those who tilled the land.

• The Bangla Congress, led by Chief Minister Ajoy Mukherjee, adopted a resolution on deteriorating law and order, implicitly targeting CPM control of the Home Ministry under Jyoti Basu.
• The resolution threatens a Gandhian satyagraha if the lawlessness situation is not resolved, though its exact target (police versus civic administration) is not specified.
• Jyoti Basu publicly rejected the premise, stating law and order in West Bengal was ‘quite satisfactory’ compared to elsewhere in India.
• The author predicts the likely outcome is a compromise curbing the CPM’s monopolistic hold on the Home Ministry (e.g., via a Cabinet Sub-Committee) rather than dissolution, since no U.F. party wants Presidential Rule.
• Looming harvest-season clashes between cultivators occupying forcibly-held land and original owners are forecast to bring large-scale violence, with CPM ministers Jyoti Basu and H. Konar directing police to favour those who tilled the land.

Reflections Of A Dying Dictator

By Elbridge Durbrow

Elbridge Durbrow, a retired U.S. career foreign service officer and former Ambassador to Vietnam, contributes a condensed, satirical article (reprinted from ‘Washington Report’) written as an imagined first-person monologue by Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi, reflecting on the state of the Vietnam War from 1966 to late 1969. The imagined Ho credits North Vietnamese tactics — refusing real concessions while extracting a U.S. bombing halt, exploiting American media’s defeatist coverage, and betting on American ‘impatience, frustration, and naivete’ — for having forced President Johnson to halt bombing and decline re-election, and for extracting tacit U.S./Thieu recognition of the Viet Cong and NLF as negotiating parties. The imagined reflections close by cataloguing three reasons the diplomatic and military picture turned in Hanoi’s favor since 1967: successful negotiating tactics, the shock effect of the 1968 Tet and May offensives on American opinion, and American impatience with the pace of talks.

• The piece is a condensed reprint of a Durbrow article for ‘Washington Report,’ framed as speculation on Ho Chi Minh’s private reflections rather than a direct quotation of him.
• The imagined Ho claims no real concessions were made in Paris despite securing a full U.S. bombing halt and tacit recognition of the Viet Cong/NLF as the Provisional Revolutionary Government.
• American mass media, particularly television’s coverage of anti-war demonstrations and ‘dire straits’ narratives (e.g., Khe Sanh), are portrayed as having been highly favorable to Hanoi’s strategic position.
• The Tet and Spring 1968 offensives are credited with badly shaking American public opinion and pressuring President Johnson into a partial bombing halt on March 31, 1968 and his subsequent decision not to seek re-election.
• The essay (as printed) closes mid-argument enumerating reasons for the shift in Hanoi’s favor: successful negotiating tactics, the shock of the 1968 offensives, and American impatience with the diplomatic process.

Books Received

The closing ‘With Many Voices’ page is a curated digest of press quotations from mid-October 1969 — spanning Indian and international commentators such as C. Rajagopalachari, Jyoti Basu, Svetlana Alliluyeva, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and Chinese news agency Hsinhua — on themes of Gandhism’s decline, Indira Gandhi’s political conduct, Communist ideology, and bank nationalisation. The page also includes a ‘Books Received’ list of six titles (on Netaji Subhas and Communism, peaceful transition to Communism in India, Indo-US relations, modern Chinese economic history, and Indian cultural unification) and a subscriber coupon for Freedom First addressed to the Democratic Research Service in Bombay.

• A digest of press quotations dated October 3-26, 1969, drawn from sources including New Statesman, The Times, Statesman, Swarajya, The Current, and Hsinhua.
• Recurring themes include the perceived death of Gandhism in India, criticism of Indira Gandhi’s political associations, and warnings about a ‘deep conspiracy’ against democracy.
• C. Rajagopalachari is quoted asserting that ‘Smt. Indira Gandhi’s mind has a dictator’s bent.’
• Svetlana Alliluyeva is quoted on Stalin as the embodiment of totalitarian Communist power built on suppression.
• A Books Received section lists six recently published titles relevant to Communism, Indo-US relations, and Chinese and Indian cultural history, alongside a Freedom First subscription coupon (annual subscription Rs. 5.00).

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